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“When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human 
quality; . . . his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for self-
realization concluded. If anything, the needs for identity and self-respect are more 
compelling in the dehumanizing prison environment.”
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Procunier v. Martinez
1
The United States imprisons a greater proportion of its own population than 
any other country in the world.
2
A legal framework provides protections for those 
individuals who are incarcerated, but that framework is flawed. The 
jurisprudence distinguishes pretrial detainees (who have not been convicted) from 
convicted persons (who are serving a sentence).
3
Based on that distinction, 
different standards apply to conditions of confinement and use of force cases 
brought by pretrial detainees and those brought by convicted persons.
4
That 
distinction–and the resulting disparate application of legal standards–does not 
comport with the reality of incarceration, the concept of punishment, or the 
principle that the Constitution still applies behind bars. This Note argues that, as
Justice Thomas has long believed, the Eighth Amendment, properly understood, 
covers only the specific sentence declared by a sentencing court. Beyond that 
specific sentence, a convicted person has a substantive due process right to be free 
from unsanctioned punishment; and therefore, any of his claims should be 
governed by the more protective due process standard that pretrial detainees enjoy.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank 
the Michigan Journal of Law Reform editors for their hard work and dedication. I am also im-
mensely grateful to Professor Margo Schlanger for her guidance as I began to navigate the 
murky waters of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. And, of course, many, many thanks to 
Carol and Kent McPhail and to Sean Fourney for always picking up the phone and always 
encouraging me.
1. 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (concurring).
2. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (May 2, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-
incarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/.
3. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979).
4. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States incarcerates over two million people, includ-
ing many who have not yet been convicted of a crime.5 The Consti-
tution protects each one of those individuals while he is incarcer-
ated, ensuring that he is not subjected to unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement or uses of force. However, the current
constitutional regime implements different levels of protection for 
pretrial detainees (who have not been convicted of a crime for 
which they are detained) and convicted persons (who are serving a 
criminal sentence).6 This discrepancy is inconsistent with the reali-
ty of incarceration, the concept of punishment, and the principle 
that the Constitution still applies behind bars. This Note proposes 
that, as Justice Thomas has consistently argued, the Eighth 
5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Correctional Populations in the Unit-
ed States, 2016 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf (reflecting the 
most recent data available).
6. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36, 537 (1979).
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Amendment applies only to whatever terms are explicitly spelled 
out in an individual’s sentence. Justice Thomas’s argument is right, 
but it actually results in more protection for those behind bars. Be-
yond what is explicitly spelled out in their sentences, convicted 
persons should be understood to enjoy the substantive due process 
right of “freedom from punishment”–or freedom from anything 
that would constitute punishment that was not explicitly sanc-
tioned by the sentencing court.
Part II outlines the constitutional framework that applies to in-
carcerated individuals, both those not yet convicted and those serv-
ing sentences. Part III details the problematic nature of the current 
framework, explaining how the doctrine creates and fuels an illog-
ical distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted persons 
that has detrimental constitutional and practical ramifications. Part 
IV proposes a new regime that would remedy these problems: nar-
rowing the scope of the Eighth Amendment and applying substan-
tive due process to govern use of force and conditions of confine-
ment claims.
II. BACKGROUND & CURRENT REGIME
A. The Constitution, Behind Bars
Even when incarcerated, an individual still has constitutional 
rights: “[T]hough his rights may be diminished by the needs and 
exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not whol-
ly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for 
a crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution 
and the prisons of this country.”7 Individuals who are incarcerated 
retain protections of the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, 
Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and other provi-
sions.8
Though incarceration does not extinguish these constitutional 
rights, it may limit them.9 Such limitations are permissible as long 
as they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.10
7. Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
8. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 
(1995) (explaining that prison regulations can create a protected liberty interest); see also
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep’t. of Correc-
tions, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging, however, that most searches and 
seizures would be considered reasonable in the prison context); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 
333, 333 (1968).
9. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
10. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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Individuals who are incarcerated can assert their general constitu-
tional rights that may be limited by incarceration, but they can also 
challenge constitutional violations specifically relating to their in-
carceration. There are two main categories of litigation regarding 
life in prison: use of force by prison officials and conditions of con-
finement.11 “Use of force litigation” addresses physical force exert-
ed by state officials,12 while “conditions of confinement litigation”
addresses medical care, sanitation, levels of overcrowding, violence 
perpetrated by other incarcerated individuals, extreme solitary 
confinement, and more.13 The following sections examine the dif-
ferent standards applied to different types of plaintiffs in prison 
cases.
B. Pretrial Detainees
Pretrial detainees frequently sue regarding harms experienced
during incarceration. Though there is some debate about when 
seizure (governed by the Fourth Amendment) ends and pretrial 
detention begins,14 courts generally consider pretrial detainees to 
11. Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL 
L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2018).
12. Cf. id.
13. See, e.g., id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (considering the quality of medi-
cal care to be a condition of confinement for the purpose of Eighth Amendment analysis); 
Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding a genuine dis-
pute of material fact about whether a jail official’s treatment of a pregnant pretrial detain-
ee’s medical needs violated her due process rights); DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974–
75 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that exposure to human waste violated the convicted person’s
Eighth Amendment rights); Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the limited provision of toilet paper to a pretrial detainee did not amount to punishment 
and therefore did not violate his due process rights); Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 
1380–81 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that overcrowding can constitute a constitutional viola-
tion); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 1980) (confirming that pretrial detain-
ees’ rights were not abridged by alleged overcrowding but acknowledging that overcrowding 
can amount to “punishment” and therefore violate pretrial detainees’ due process rights); 
Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640–41 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that prison officials’ failure to 
protect an individual from attack by allowing the attack to occur may constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation); Richko v. Wayne County, Mich., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that pretrial detainees have a due process right to be protected from violence at 
the hands of other incarcerated people); Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp. 447, 452–53 (N.D. 
Iowa 1974) (explaining that solitary confinement, with more, can constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that plaintiff’s specific allegations of extreme solitary confinement, if true, would consti-
tute a violation of due process). It is important to note that although the line between “use 
of force” and “conditions of confinement” can blur, Schlanger, supra note 11, at 365, this 
shorthand provides a useful, albeit simplified, way to understand the courts’ doctrinal ap-
proach to these types of cases.
14. Erica Haber, Note, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit Court Split 
on when Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 19 N.Y. L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS 939, 948–50 (2003); see also Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the 
Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 823–24 (1990).
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be those lawfully detained but not yet convicted of the alleged 
crime for which they have been detained.15 Because pretrial de-
tainees have not yet been convicted of their alleged crimes, they 
cannot be punished (through use of force or conditions of con-
finement) by the state.16
Under Kingsley v. Hendrickson, force against pretrial detainees is 
unlawful if the force is (1) itself purposeful, knowing, or reckless; 
and also (2) objectively unreasonable.17 As a threshold matter, the 
plaintiff must show that the officer used force knowingly or pur-
posefully.18 Otherwise, the Court explains, “if an officer’s Taser 
goes off by accident or if an officer unintentionally trips and falls 
on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot pre-
vail on an excessive force claim.”19 After making the preliminary 
determination that the force was intentional, a court must then de-
termine whether the force was objectively reasonable, considering 
the circumstances from the officer’s perspective at the time of the 
incident.20 Several factors can contribute to this determination, in-
cluding but not limited to
the relationship between the need for the use of force and 
the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s inju-
ry; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the 
amount of force; the severity of the security problem at is-
sue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and 
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.21
The standard governing conditions of confinement for pretrial 
detainees is based on the same fundamental principle: pretrial de-
tainees cannot be punished.22 In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court reasoned 
that any condition amounting to “punishment” violates pretrial de-
tainees’ constitutional right to due process because they have not 
yet been convicted of a crime.23 Any condition that is subjectively 
intended as punishment or that is not reasonably related to a legit-
15. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015).
16. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). This protection arises from the Constitu-
tion’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of due process. See id. at 532–33 (ex-
plaining that it is substantive due process, rather than the presumption of innocence, that 
protects pretrial detainees from punishment).
17. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472–73.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2472.
20. Id. at 2472–73.
21. Id. at 2473.
22. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979).
23. Id. at 535–36.
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imate governmental objective is considered to be punishment.24
Justice Rehnquist explained that legitimate government objectives 
may include, but are not necessarily limited to, ensuring the pre-
trial detainee is present at trial, maintaining security, and keeping 
order at the jail or facility.25
C. Convicted Persons26
Unlike pretrial detainees, convicted persons are those currently 
serving a sentence for crimes of which they have been convicted. 
Convicted persons “may be punished, although that punishment 
may not be ‘cruel and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment.”27
In its inception, the Eighth Amendment was targeted at torture 
and other “physically barbarous punishments.”28 However, in the 
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to apply the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment to punishments that contravene “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”29 Ultimately, the Eighth Amendment was extended by the 
Supreme Court to regulate not only the sentences given out by 
24. Id. at 538–39.
25. Id. at 540.
26. In this Note, I will refer to individuals who have been convicted of crimes and are 
serving sentences for those convictions as “convicted persons.” Although much of the exist-
ing scholarship refers to this population as “prisoners” or “inmates,” see, e.g., Dianna L. Nel-
son, Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Standard of Eighth Amendment Application to the Use of 
Excessive Force against Prison Inmates, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1814 (1993); Jordan A. Shannon, Note, 
Reasonableness as Corrections Reform in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 62 LOY. L. REV. 577 (2016), that 
language is perniciously reductive, confining the identity of convicted persons solely to their 
crime and punishment. See Khalil Cumberbatch, Letter to the Editor, “I Remember when I First 
Heard the Term ‘Inmate.’ It Was Used to Describe Me.”, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, Apr. 1, 2015, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/letters/387-khalil-cumberbatch-letter-i-remember-
when-i-first-heard-the-term (“I remember when I first heard the term ‘inmate’ . . . I recall 
feeling violated. It was the first time in my life that someone used a term—to my face—to 
describe me in a way that dehumanized me on so many levels.”); Tina Reynolds, Glossary of 
Terms, in INTERRUPTED LIFE: EXPERIENCES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
26–27 (Rickie Solinger et al. eds., 2010); Eddie Ellis, founder-director, Center for NuLead-
ership on Urban Solutions, An Open Letter to Our Friends on the Question of Language, https://
cnus.squarespace.com/language-letter-campaign/ (click on the hyperlinked phrase “our 
letter to partners and allies”) (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). In order to properly understand 
what is at stake in answering these legal questions, the language used in these discussions 
must conceptualize “prisoners” as people.
27. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16.
28. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 373 (1910). Note, Weems interpreted the Philippine Bill of Rights, which prohibited 
cruel and unusual punishment and was considered to have the same meaning as the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. Thus, it carries prec-
edential value in U.S. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (citing Weems).
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courts, but also the use of force against and the conditions of 
confinement experienced by convicted persons.30 For anything 
beyond the fact of incarceration, specifically use of force and 
conditions of confinement, only the “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.31
In Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court declared that use of force 
against a convicted person is only unlawful, or unnecessary and 
wanton, when it is done “maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm.”32 Thus, a subjective intent requirement 
was born.33 However, courts may consider other factors when eval-
uating intent, including the necessity of force, the proportionality 
of force used to the degree of necessity, any resulting injury to a 
convicted person, and any efforts to lessen the force used.34
Though the degree of a convicted person’s injury can be a factor 
in determining whether the force was malicious and sadistic, a 
convicted person does not have to suffer a serious injury to suffer a 
violation of his or her Eighth Amendment right.35
Estelle v. Gamble, one of the first conditions of confinement cases 
heard by the Supreme Court,36 held that subjective intent, which 
can be shown by proving deliberate indifference, was also neces-
sary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation due to prison condi-
tions (in that case, a lack of medical care).37 Further cases contin-
ued to develop the doctrine, requiring both an objective showing 
and a subjective showing to prove that prison conditions violate the 
Eighth Amendment.38 First, the deprivation caused by the condi-
tions must be objectively “sufficiently serious.”39 Second, “if the 
pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute 
or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed 
to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”40 This “mental ele-
ment,” or deliberate indifference to prison conditions, occurs only 
30. E.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. Note, the 
Eighth Amendment also limits state, as well as federal, power, by virtue of incorporation in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
31. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669–670 (1977) (citations omitted).
32. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21.
33. See Schlanger, supra note 11, at 377–78 (explaining the subjective intent require-
ment in the context of efforts to retake prisons during riots).
34. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21.
35. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
36. Schlanger, supra note 11, at 369-70.
37. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
38. E.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36
(1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
39. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (“The Constitution, we said, ‘does not mandate comfortable 
prisons,’ and only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s neces-
sities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (citing 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 347 (1981)).
40. Wilson, 501 U.S. 199; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
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when a prison official (1) is actually aware of “an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety” and (2) disregards that risk.41
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT REGIME
A. The Status Quo: An Untenable Distinction
The standards governing use of force and conditions of con-
finement for pretrial detainees, grounded in due process rights, 
differ significantly from the standards used for convicted persons, 
which are grounded in the Eighth Amendment.42 This creates an 
untenable divide between pretrial and post-conviction individuals 
that ignores the constitutional rights of convicted persons. This di-
vide proves absurd in application.
In 2015, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley revealed this 
tension inherent in the doctrinal separation of pretrial and post-
conviction individuals.43 By establishing an objective reasonable-
ness standard for pretrial detainees,44 in contrast to the subjective 
standard for convicted persons,45 Kingsley created a pronounced 
distinction. The practical outcome of this distinction is illogical: a 
pretrial detainee and a convicted person who are housed in the 
same institution and who undergo the same exact use of force can 
have different legal outcomes. Thus, even if the prison official us-
ing the force does not know that one is a pretrial detainee and the 
other is a convicted person, that official could be liable for his ac-
tions against the pretrial detainee while escaping liability for his ac-
tions against the convicted person.46 Currently, according to the 
Supreme Court, the two similarly situated individuals have very dif-
ferent rights.
Examples may illustrate this dichotomy. The following cases 
have similar fact patterns; however, in one case, the plaintiff is a 
pretrial detainee, and in the other, the plaintiff is a convicted per-
son. In Choate v. Arms, a pretrial detainee “escaped his maximum 
41. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
42. See discussion supra Part II.
43. See discussion supra Part II.B.
44. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).
45. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986).
46. It is also worth noting that an individual can occupy both the status of pretrial de-
tainee and convicted person at the same time: for example, if he or she is serving a sentence 
and is charged for another crime. This shows that the distinction is not so sound as the 
Court implies.
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security cell and refused to return.”47 When a guard was escorting 
Choate back to his cell, Choate, handcuffed at the time, turned 
toward the guard and uttered a profane threat against the guard’s
family.48 Believing Choate to pose a security risk, the guard says 
that he “grabbed [him] and put him against the wall,” resulting in 
Choate “bump[ing] his head” against the wall.49 Choate, on the 
other hand, alleges that the guard used more force, choking him 
and slamming him into the wall.50 The court denied the defend-
ant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a genu-
ine dispute of material fact that, if resolved in the favor of the 
plaintiff, would constitute a due process violation.51
Similarly, in Brown v. Smith, a convicted person had a verbal con-
frontation with guards immediately prior to the incident, in which 
he resisted returning to his cell.52 In response, though Brown, the 
convicted person, claims that he was handcuffed at the time,53
“guard Smith placed his riot baton against Brown’s neck with some 
degree of force, pinned him against a wall, and that another officer 
came to assist Smith put Brown back into his cell.”54 The facts in 
Brown are similar to those in Choate. In each case, the incarcerated 
individual had engaged in a verbal confrontation with guards and 
then resisted moving into a cell. Even so, the outcome was differ-
ent: in Brown, the Eleventh Circuit granted the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute of material fact
and determining that, even if the allegations were true, Brown had 
not pled facts that would amount to an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.55
The Court roots this doctrinal distinction in the presence or lack 
of a conviction.56 In short, if there is a conviction, the Eighth 
Amendment applies (governing use of force and conditions of 
confinement with a more lenient standard); if not, substantive due 
process applies.57 But as the Court has made clear, “[t]here is no 
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of 
47. Choate v. Arms, 274 F. Supp. 3d 782, 783 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 784.
51. Id. at 787.
52. Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 1189 n.3.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1189–90.
56. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475.
57. See, e.g., id.
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this country.”58 So, why do convicted persons not enjoy the same 
rights as pretrial detainees?
B. Constitutional Implications
1. “Freedom from Punishment”
The protections afforded pretrial detainees arise not from the 
presumption of innocence but from their substantive due process 
right to be “[free] from punishment.”59 On the other hand, the 
Court implies, convicted persons have no right to be free from 
punishment.60 The question of what “freedom from punishment”
means depends, of course, on the definition of punishment. The 
word can have two different meanings: punishment can either be 
(1) an individual person’s sentence for a specific crime (individual 
punishment) or (2) an entire category of sanctions (category of 
punishment).61 The Court’s current stance is that a convicted per-
son has no right to be free from the entire category of punish-
ment.62
However, that conclusion is illogical. A convicted person unde-
niably may be punished for his crime, but that wrongdoing should 
not subject him to the entire category of punishment. Thus, “free-
dom from punishment” is more precisely described as freedom 
from punishment not explicitly sanctioned by the sentencing court, and 
convicted persons also enjoy that substantive due process right. 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of punishment supports this in-
terpretation, asserting that punishment is a “sanction — such as a 
fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege 
— assessed against a person who has violated the law.”63 If punish-
ment is the finite sentence a court assesses against a defendant, 
then “freedom from punishment” means “freedom from any pun-
ishment beyond that which a court specifically sanctioned as the 
person’s individual punishment.” The freedom would thus apply to 
anything beyond an individual’s finite sentence. The current re-
gime fundamentally disregards the important difference between 
individual punishment and the category of punishment. The re-
sulting doctrine renders each convicted person susceptible to the 
58. Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
59. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
60. Id. at 535 n.16.
61. For clarity, this note will refer to the different types of punishment as “individual 
punishment” and “category of punishment.”
62. Cf., Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16.
63. Punishment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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entire category of punishment, rather than just his or her individ-
ual punishment.
A hypothetical provides a useful case study to understand this 
concept. John Doe was convicted of a crime. His sentence required 
him to serve ten years in prison and included no other specifica-
tions. While in prison, Mr. Doe was subjected to severe overcrowd-
ing. Under the current regime, the overcrowding, even if it is 
“punishment,” would not violate Mr. Doe’s constitutional rights 
unless it is cruel and unusual.64 On the other hand, if “freedom 
from punishment” is understood as “freedom from the category of 
punishment beyond an individual punishment,” anything beyond 
Mr. Doe’s incarceration of ten years is in excess of his individual 
punishment. Therefore, he has a right to be free from that pun-
ishment, whether or not it is cruel and unusual. Under such a re-
gime, the overcrowding would violate Mr. Doe’s constitutional 
rights if the overcrowding is not reasonably related to a legitimate 
government objective.65
C. Practical Implications
1. Barriers to Claims by Convicted Persons
The current regime has established serious hurdles that convict-
ed persons’ claims must overcome. Specifically, the requirement of 
subjective intent to prove an Eighth Amendment violation66 is a 
high bar to reach. Even though the subjective intent requirement 
can be met by a showing of “deliberate indifference”67 or “mali-
cious[] and sadistic[] [force] with the purpose of causing harm,”68
the evidence required to convincingly make such allegations is dif-
ficult to acquire, especially from within the walls of a prison.
2. Social Perception
Additionally, the law has significant power to influence social 
norms.69 Consequently, the current regime influences the way soci-
64. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
65. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39.
66. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
67. Id.
68. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986).
69. Cf. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1235, 1263 (2016) (discussing the power of criminal law to express 
social norms).
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ety thinks about convicted persons and their quality of life in pris-
on.70 The current regime imagines that prison itself, and all of the 
indignities that come with it, even those beyond a person’s indi-
vidual punishment, is appropriate punishment. Therefore, the 
current regime has serious consequences for society’s perception 
of the occurrence of constitutional violations in prisons and of 
convicted persons themselves.
First, it normalizes degrading treatment in prisons. By setting 
such high thresholds to establish Eighth Amendment violations,71
the Court allows anything below those thresholds to occur without 
repercussion, even if the conduct is dehumanizing or brutal.72 In 
doing so, those practices, some of which might not be acceptable 
under the standards governing the rights of pretrial detainees, are 
normalized.
Second, the current regime influences society’s perceptions of 
convicted persons. In the eyes of the Court, convicted persons do 
not have a right to be free from punishment, even when the pun-
ishment exceeds their individual sentence.73 Regardless of his or 
her crime, once a convicted person is behind bars, he or she is 
classified as a prisoner, subject to punishment, and nothing more.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORM: APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In an attempt to establish a regulatory framework for what hap-
pens in prison, courts held that the Eighth Amendment governs 
conditions of confinement for post-conviction inmates.74 But Kings-
ley highlighted the availability of other tools to deal with this, par-
ticularly the due process clause as used to protect pretrial detain-
ees. Under this proposal, the Eighth Amendment should be 
understood as governing only whatever is explicitly included in the 
sentence and nothing else. For all other purposes, a convicted per-
son shares the same legal status as a pretrial detainee: because the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to conditions of confinement 
and use of force cases, those claims are governed by substantive 
due process (as long as the alleged violation was not formally part 
of the person’s sentence).75
70. Cf. id.
71. See discussion supra Part III.B.
72. See discussion supra Part II.C.
73. See discussion supra Part III.A.
74. See Schlanger, supra note 11, at 368–69; cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–04 
(1976).
75. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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A. Narrow the Eighth Amendment’s Purview: 
Following Justice Thomas’s Lead
Justice Thomas has consistently insisted on an originalist defini-
tion of punishment–one that aligns with this Note’s use of the term 
“individual punishment.” He insisted that the Eighth Amendment 
“was not deemed to apply at all to deprivations that were not in-
flicted as part of the sentence for a crime . . . [judges and commen-
tators in the early Republic] did not conceive of the Eighth 
Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh treatment.”76 He 
later reiterated, “I adhere to my belief . . . that judges or juries—
but not jailers—impose ‘punishment’. . . . Because the unfortunate 
attack that befell petitioner was not a part of his sentence, it did 
not constitute ‘punishment under the Eighth Amendment.’”77
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas reluctantly acquiesced to the 
Court’s use of the dual-pronged objective and subjective test set 
forth in Wilson v. Seiter.78 In Wilson, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice 
Thomas in part that the Court should take an originalist and tex-
tualist approach to defining the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment; however, Justice Scalia extend-
ed the Eighth Amendment’s reach to include intentional violations 
perpetrated by state officials.79 He wrote, “If the pain inflicted is 
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentenc-
ing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflict-
ing officer before it can qualify.”80 Justice Scalia’s willingness to 
“cut the Eighth Amendment loose from its historical moorings and 
[apply] it to a broad range of prison deprivations”81 stretched his 
textualist interpretive principles to, and possibly beyond, their lim-
it. Perhaps, he thought an exception was necessary because refus-
ing to regulate deliberate conduct by officers would be untenable 
and absurd. But if the Eighth Amendment does not apply, it is not 
necessarily true that intentional conduct would go unaddressed, as 
explained below in Part IV.B.
Justice Thomas’s analysis diverges from the Court’s view, as an-
nounced in Wilson by Justice Scalia, that punishment can occur at 
the hands of correctional officials as long as there is subjective in-
tent. The regime proposed by this Note endorses Justices Thomas’s
76. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).
78. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 18–19 (Thomas, J. dissenting); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 859–60 
(Thomas, J., concurring).
79. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
80. Id.
81. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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approach, defining the scope of the Eighth Amendment to cover 
only that which is “meted out by . . . the statute or the sentencing 
judge.”82 Consequentially, the Eighth Amendment covers only what 
is absolutely necessary to effectuate the sentence and nothing 
more. A prison sentence could still be served in a facility with cushy 
conditions and an absolute policy against the use of force; there-
fore, conditions of confinement and use of force cannot be a nec-
essary part of punishment. Thus, the Eighth Amendment covers 
the deprivation of a convicted person’s liberty but not use of force 
or conditions of confinement (so long as those are not specified by 
the sentencing court). The characteristics of punishment in the 
United States–specifically the nature of punishment and restraints 
thereon–support the proposed regime’s approach.
First, a sentence is assessed against an individual in response to a 
specific criminal act, which has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt and which is generally condemned by society. This concept 
of stimulus (crime) and response (punishment) is refined by the 
principle of proportionality, which has a significant historical ped-
igree.83 Proportionality serves more than one role in the criminal 
justice process: while the concept of proportionality has been in-
corporated into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,84 it exists inde-
pendently as a fundamental characteristic of punishment.85 And 
this characteristic of punishment presupposes that the punisher 
has complete control over the punishment that is doled out, so as 
to ensure it is proportional. Therefore, “punishment,” for the pur-
poses of the Eighth Amendment, should be confined to a person’s
individual punishment: otherwise, there would be no way to ensure 
that exposure to the entire category of punishment is proportional 
to the crime committed.
Moreover, the choice to include conditions of confinement and 
use of force in the Eighth Amendment’s purview renders “pun-
ishment” inconsistent. Different institutions–even similar types of 
institutions within the same district–can have different conditions 
of confinement and use of force.86 If two individuals are sentenced 
to the same term of years for the same crime and then are housed 
82. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
83. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910).
84. See O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (“The in-
hibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but against 
all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to 
the offenses charged.”).
85. See Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910).
86. Christopher Wildeman et al., Conditions of Confinement in American Prisons and Jails,
ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI., June 2018, at 19.10 (2018); see also Scott D. Camp, Do Inmate 
Survey Data Reflect Prison Conditions? Using Surveys to Assess Prison Conditions of Confinement, 79 
PRISON J. 250, 250 (1999).
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in separate facilities, one person may experience harsher condi-
tions of confinement and use of force than the other person. Sure-
ly, that result does not effectuate the legislative intent behind 
whatever sentencing guidance is enshrined in statutes.
Additionally, punishment is presumably rendered by an authori-
ty, namely a judge or jury. Specifically, the Eighth Amendment is 
“inten[ded] to limit the power of those entrusted with the crimi-
nal-law function of government.”87 That does not include correc-
tional officers: though they perform the mechanical duties of in-
carceration, such as supervision and transportation, it is a stretch 
to say they are “entrusted with the criminal-law function of gov-
ernment.” Prison officials do not have any say in the prescription 
of a defendant’s sentence and are not required to have legal edu-
cation. And ultimately, individual punishments may not be altered 
by anyone, including legal authorities, outside of the proper chan-
nels for direct or collateral review.
Relatedly, the current regime undermines democratic account-
ability. While legislatures often set sentencing guidelines, which as-
sist in determining the sentence sanctioned by a court, conditions 
of confinement and use of force are largely determined by prison 
officials. Therefore, different parts of the “punishment” governed 
by the Eighth Amendment come from different decisionmakers.88
As a result, the public does not know which decisionmakers are re-
sponsible for what decision, and therefore the mechanisms of ac-
countability are weakened.
B. In That Void, Substantive Due Process Applies
The Eighth Amendment is not the only regulatory tool in effect 
in prisons; substantive due process is also available to govern what 
the Eighth Amendment does not.89 This Note proposes that, with 
respect to anything that does not fall within the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment, convicted persons would functionally share 
the legal status of pretrial detainees: any use of force or conditions 
of confinement allegations would be governed by the substantive 
due process standards announced in Kingsley90 and Bell.91
Of course, if a specific decree in the Bill of Rights applies to a 
certain action, substantive due process is not appropriate to govern 
87. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
88. Cf. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 732 (2017).
89. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36, 537 (1979).
90. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472–73 (2015).
91. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–36.
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that action.92 But this Note argues that the Eighth Amendment is 
more narrow: adopting Justice Thomas’s definition of “punish-
ment,” the Eighth Amendment does not govern use of force or 
conditions of confinement claims brought by convicted persons. 
The Eighth Amendment regulates “punishment,” which includes 
only whatever is specifically included in a convicted person’s sen-
tence. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment only governs if: (1) a 
person has been convicted of a crime; (2) the sentencing authority 
has imposed a specific sentence; and (3) the proposed object of 
regulation was expressly included in the sentence. Beyond that 
realm, an individual still retains the substantive due process protec-
tion ensuring “freedom from punishment [that was not sanctioned 
by a court].” In that formulation, substantive due process regulates 
only what the Eighth Amendment’s reduced scope excludes.
Each population of individuals, pretrial detainees and convicted 
persons, is detained for a specific purpose: pretrial detainees to en-
sure their presence at trial and convicted persons to allow the state 
to impose a sentence. That incarceration necessarily carries with it 
incidental occurrences or obligations, such as the need to provide 
incarcerated individuals with sustenance, shelter, and medical 
care. The detention of pretrial detainees is justified by the state’s
need to ensure their appearance at trial.93 Convicted persons’ in-
carceration is analogous. They are incarcerated for a government 
purpose: to deprive them of liberty, pursuant to a criminal sen-
tence. And incidental to that incarceration is the state’s treatment 
of a convicted person while that person is deprived of his or her 
liberty. The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged this, ex-
plaining, “These elementary principles establish the government’s
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing 
by incarceration.”94 Therefore, convicted persons are similarly situ-
ated to pretrial detainees: they are incarcerated to serve a legiti-
mate government purpose and, aside from that purpose, should 
retain substantive due process rights regarding conditions of con-
finement and the use of force.
92. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment 
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of 
government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive 
due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
93. Cf., Bell, 441 U.S. at 523.
94. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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C. Mechanics: How the Proposed Regime Would Work
Some examples may clarify how the proposed regime would 
function. Sentences are often a term of years, but sometimes they 
include more specific determinations. For example, the state of 
Louisiana sentences people to terms of years at hard labor.95 Be-
cause the requirement of “hard labor” is a directive from the sen-
tencing court, if challenged, it would be evaluated under the 
Eighth Amendment. On the other hand, if state officials running a 
prison imposed the requirement of hard labor on convicted per-
sons without a directive from the sentencing court, the require-
ment would be evaluated under the due process standard.
Or, for example, if an individual were specifically sentenced to 
serve time in a supermax facility, where every person lives in what 
is functionally solitary confinement,96 the sentence would be evalu-
ated under the Eighth Amendment. However, if a convicted per-
son were transferred there without a court directive, any condi-
tions of confinement allegations would be evaluated as if he or she 
were a pretrial detainee.
Another example: a woman in Texas was sentenced to thirty 
days in jail for neglecting her horses, and as part of her sentence, 
the judge ordered that she receive only bread and water as suste-
nance for the first three days of her sentence.97 Because the court 
ordered the sustenance limitations as part of the woman’s punish-
ment, under the proposed paradigm, those restrictions would be 
evaluated under the Eighth Amendment if challenged. On the
other hand, if the judge had not ordered those specific “dietary re-
strictions” but state correctional officials had imposed them any-
way, any challenge to those restrictions would be evaluated under 
an objective due process standard.
This proposed regime is not impractical to implement. Courts 
already implement objective standards when evaluating the claims 
of pretrial detainees. And, as the Supreme Court noted in Kingsley,
an objective standard is workable and also protects officers acting 
95. Julia O’Donoghue, Sheriff: Louisiana’s Early Release of Prisoners Means Loss of ‘the Ones 
You Can Work,’ TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/
2017/10/louisiana_good _prisoners.html (quoting the Caddo County Sherriff’s Office as 
saying “It is a fact that state inmates serving a hard-labor sentence can be required to work as 
part of their court-ordered sentence in Louisiana”); see, e.g., State v. Brown, 849 So. 2d 566, 
569 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
96. E.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 209 (2005).
97. Horse Neglect Draws Bread-and-Water Sentence, NBC NEWS (June 8, 2004), http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/5164349/ns/us_news-weird_news/t/horse-neglect-draws-bread-and-
water-sentence/#.WneghJM-e9Z.
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in good faith.98 Because the standards for use of force and condi-
tions of confinement for pretrial detainees already exist, they have 
been developed in case law. Consequently, there is no need for a 
completely new standard; because there is already guidance in case 
law, there will be less uncertainty as convicted persons’ rights are 
vindicated through these same standards.
D. Benefits of the Proposed Regime
1. Doctrinal Outcomes
Proponents of extending the Eighth Amendment’s meaning cite 
its dependence on “evolving standards of decency.”99 But the 
“evolving standards of decency” (emphasis added) refers to the 
standard that evaluates the content–not the content that is evaluat-
ed. The proposed regime would render the doctrinal foundation 
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence more coherent. Moreover, 
the proposed regime essentially maintains the current legal struc-
ture. In other words, although it would implement significant 
changes in practice, it does not completely overrule the current 
regime. Rather, the analysis merely shifts: courts would evaluate 
the same issues, and the standards governing constitutional guar-
antees would remain the same. The constitutional tools are all still 
in the toolbox, but under the proposed regime, courts would be 
using the proper tools. Estelle would still govern Eighth Amend-
ment conditions of confinement cases, and Whitley would still gov-
ern Eighth Amendment use of force claims–those claims would just 
be limited to any punishments meted out by the sentencing court. 
However, the proposed regime would eliminate the untenable dis-
tinction between convicted persons and pretrial detainees.100 This 
shift would ultimately result in more coherence in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which is currently lacking.101
Additionally, the proposed regime would impose an objective 
standard in most use of force and conditions of confinement cases.
Both scholars and judges have argued that Eighth Amendment 
98. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015); see also Jordan A. Shannon, 
Note, Reasonableness as Corrections Reform in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 62 LOY. L. REV. 577, 599 
(2016).
99. Cf.., William H. Forman, Jr., The Cruel Punishment Proscription: Evolving Standards of 
Decency, 19 LOY. L. REV. 81, 105 (1972). Note that even Justice Thomas, though disagreeing 
with its use, contextualizes the regulation of additional conduct in prisons as Eighth 
Amendment violations through this phrase. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).
100. See discussion supra Part III.A.
101. See Schlanger, supra note 11, at 361.
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analyses should be governed by an objective standard.102 Justice 
Stevens, for example, dissented in Estelle, protesting, “[w]hether 
the constitutional standard has been violated should turn on the 
character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the in-
dividual who inflicted it. Whether the conditions . . . were 
the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cru-
el and inhuman.”103 Even though the solution proposed here does 
not change the standards under the Eighth Amendment, it would 
impose an objective standard for much of what the Eighth 
Amendment currently covers. That leaves open another distinct 
question: whether the current Eighth Amendment standards, re-
quiring both an objective and a subjective showing, are appropri-
ate.
2. Practical and Social Outcomes
The proposed regime would reduce barriers to the legitimate 
constitutional claims of convicted persons. Removing those barri-
ers–such as the impractical requirement to prove an officer’s sub-
jective intent or the high bar required by previous Eighth Amend-
ment standards–would increase convicted persons’ access to the 
judicial system and legitimize the judicial system as a mechanism to 
defend the constitutional rights of all people.
Moreover, this Note’s proposal enhances the transparency and 
democratic accountability of the criminal justice system. Criminal 
laws are a product of our government, which is a product of the 
democratic process. And civilians serve an important role in moni-
toring the criminal justice system and providing a check on the 
power of its institutions. Because the proposed solution would clar-
ify and delineate an individual’s punishment at the time of sen-
tencing (allowing nothing further to be imposed), citizens would 
more easily be able to understand the impact of local, state, or fed-
eral laws. The proposed regime would improve the criminal justice 
process by making it more explicit and accessible.104 In doing so, it 
may enhance the democratic accountability of our systems of crim-
inal justice.105
102. E.g., id.; Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 948 (2009); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116–17 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).
103. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Cf. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 732 (2017) (ar-
guing that clarity and specificity in law “creates democratic accountability”).
105. Cf. id.
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Additionally, the proposed regime would cultivate a new and 
better way of thinking about convicted persons. As discussed above, 
the law plays a role in defining social norms.106 By acknowledging 
that not everything that happens in prison is governed by the 
Eighth Amendment and that convicted persons can have other, ac-
tionable constitutional claims regarding their treatment in prison, 
the proposed paradigm would do more to recognize the humanity 
of convicted persons. Rather than casting convicted persons away 
in prison and seeing them only as an “inmates,” the proposed re-
gime maintains a perception of a convicted person as a member of 
society who, though he has lost some constitutional rights by virtue 
of his criminal conviction, still retains many rights and deserves the 
protection of those guarantees.
V. CONCLUSION
Close inspection of current doctrine governing conditions of 
confinement and use of force for pretrial detainees and convicted 
persons reveals an inherent tension that, upon examination, can-
not withstand scrutiny. Specifically, the application of a substantive 
due process protection ensuring “freedom from punishment” to 
pretrial detainees but not to convicted persons defies fundamental 
principles of our criminal justice system. Therefore, the scope of 
the Eighth Amendment is properly understood as covering only a 
specified sentence. Then, the substantive due process right of 
“freedom from punishment” and its objective standard govern any-
thing beyond a specified sentence, including conditions of con-
finement or use of force.
The proposed regime offers many significant benefits. First, it 
does not disrupt the doctrine’s current standards at all; rather, it 
merely suggests a shift in the content to which those standards ap-
ply. Second, it offers coherence to Eighth Amendment doctrine 
that is currently lacking, potentially resolving some of the issues 
addressed in other scholarship arguing for an objective standard in 
Eighth Amendment cases. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it 
recognizes the inherent dignity of convicted persons. The pro-
posed regime acknowledges that a crime was committed and that 
there is a punishment for that crime. But it conceptualizes a con-
victed person as more than just a criminal; specifically, the pro-
106. Cf. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1235, 1263 (2016) (discussing the power of criminal law to express 
social norms).
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posed regime acknowledges that a convicted person not only re-
tains–but also deserves–robust constitutional protections.
